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Today, 200 years after the publication of Malthus’ essay on population, we tend to perceive 
global population and environment prospects quite differently than 20 years ago, i.e. 180 
years after the Malthus publication. In this sense a 10 percent time lapse brought a significant 
change in the reading and the relevance of this particular publication.
In the 1970s thinking about future global population trends and the environment was heavily 
influenced by The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972), a report to the Club of Rome. It 
is based on an economic, demographic and environmental simulation model, called World3, 
which is applied to the world taken as a whole. Within five years this book sold over 3 million 
copies which makes it by far the best selling book in the field. Substantively, the model is 
almost perfectly Malthusian in the sense that it is built around the notion of exponential 
growth. This is contrasted to the assumption of strictly limited natural resources. The model 
begins with a fixed stock of non-renewable resources which are being depleted over time. 
Since there is no technological change in the non-renewable resource sector, nor any substi­
tution between the resources, this process causes output to collapse. While moderate Malthu­
sian models tend to predict that population growth would wipe out all productivity gains and 
keep the people at a subsistence standard of living, World3 -  where such effects are rein­
forced through powerful positive feedback loops -  goes even beyond Malthus, confronting 
us with the nightmare of an impending ’’sudden and uncontrollable decline” (Sanderson 1994).
World3 has been criticized heavily, and modelers have learned many lessons since the 1970s. 
One of the important lessons is that the world is much too heterogeneous to apply the same 
behavioral equations to different parts of the world under very different cultural, institu­
tional, economic and environmental conditions. Another lesson is that the model should not 
be too highly integrated, which makes it a "black box”  in which even a highly skilled user 
does not understand why the model produces certain results under certain conditions. Fi­
nally, an intersectoral model should also satisfy the sectoral disciplinary concerns by being
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based on the best scientific understanding in the individual fields. These justified criticisms 
o f  models o f the type o f World3 have led to a situation that during the 1980s, very little 
modeling o f this sort was done and serious scientists went back to the safer areas of sectoral 
modeling in population, the economy and various environmental fields. It was not until the 
early 1990s that a new generation o f intersectoral models was bom (partly in association 
with the 1992 Rio Earth Summit), based on the understanding that after all in the real world 
the sectors depend on each other even though scientists like to consider them independently. 
These new models, such as the Population-Development-Environment (PDE) models devel­
oped at IIASA, try to accommodate the concerns described and are more modest in terms o f 
geographical coverage (they tend to follow a case study approach) and in terms o f integration 
o f  sectors (they tend to have a modular structure where the user can easily modify the link­
ages between the sectors).
At the level o f global environmental concern, the emphasis has also shifted away from the 
depleting o f nonrenewable resources to man-made interference into the natural system, most 
notably climate change, the ozone hole and decline in biodiversity. Air and water pollution as 
well as soil degradation are being recognized as important problems on a more local and 
regional scale. It is also being recognized that the interactions between the environment and 
the human population follow highly complex nonlinear mechanisms in which economic value 
and substitution as well as technological advance also play important roles which are not 
appropriately captured by the simple Malthusian paradigm.
As to world population trends the picture has also dramatically changed over the last two to 
three decades. Around 1970 the world population was growing at a record rate o f 2 percent 
per year and the total fertility rate at the global level was around five children per woman. 
Due to the great mortality improvements during the 1950s and 1970s the net reproduction 
rate even peaked in 1965-70 at a level o f 1.86 which may well be an all-time high for the 
human species on this planet. At this speed the population would have grown by 86 percent 
from one generation to the next or doubled in 35 years. Under such conditions it is no won­
der that concern about the ’’population explosion” dominated our thinking. By today the total 
fertility rate o f the world population has fallen to almost half that level and more than one- 
third o f  the world population is below replacement level. Due to the momentum o f popula­
tion growth, however, the growth rate is still at 1.3 percent per year. This dramatic change has 
also shifted the focus o f our concerns from population size to population age structure, one 
aspect o f the population variable that was hardly anticipated by Malthus.
A probabilistic outlook of future global population 
growth and aging
The most common way o f thinking about future population prospects is to calculate one 
future path that is considered most likely according to our present anticipation o f future 
fertility, mortality and migration trends. But this gives the users no information about the 
degree o f uncertainty involved in these calculations and it also cannot distinguish between 
anticipated trends that are robust and those that are very sensitive to alternative assumptions.
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There are two traditional ways to deal with uncertainty. One is to present alternative sce­
narios (of unknown probability) which demonstrate the outcomes o f alternative combina­
tions o f assumptions. The other is to present high and low variants (which are typically based 
on high versus low fertility assumptions) in addition to the medium variant. These three vari­
ants produce some range (which is often called a ’’plausible range”) which, however, does not 
have any explicit probabilistic rationale. It is not clear whether the given range is supposed to 
cover 50 percent, 67 percent, 90 percent or 99 percent o f all possible future paths. This 
information which is important for any user can only be provided by fully probabilistic popu­
lation projections.
There is no one simple way o f applying probabilistic methods to population projections (Lutz 
et al. 1999; Lee 1999). Assumptions about the future variance o f the distributions o f the 
three components have traditionally been based on time series analysis or ex-post analysis o f 
projection errors. Both approaches have methodological problems, but the most important 
flaw for a global projection is the lack o f appropriate time series data for large parts o f the 
world population. For this reason the IIASA projections (which are summarized here; see 
Lutz 1996) chose an approach that is more intensively based on expert judgement. The pro­
cedure fits a normal distribution to the three values (high, central and low) that resulted from 
expert discussions, with 90 percent o f the cases lying between the high and low values.1 
Results were derived through a set o f 4,000 simulations that randomly combined fertility, 
mortality and migration paths from the three normal distributions for the 13 world regions. 
These simulations also considered the possibility that fertility and mortality trends may be 
correlated within regions (e.g. high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to go hand 
in hand with high mortality than low mortality) and that regional trends may be either inde­
pendent o f each other (e.g. fertility in sub-Saharan Africa uncorrelated with fertility in Latin 
America) or correlated.
Figure 1 shows the distribution o f future population sizes derived from the full set o f 4,000 
projections at five-year intervals to the year 2100. The high and low boundaries give the 
range into which 95 percent o f all cases fall. The upper line indicates that there is an unlikely 
possibility o f almost linear population growth between 1995 and 2100. The lower line shows 
that there is also an equally unlikely possibility that the world’s population would peak in the 
middle o f  the 21st century and fall thereafter to below 6 billion by 2100. The much more 
probable range o f future paths (between the 0.2 and 0.8 fractiles, covering 60 percent o f all 
cases) is remarkably small. By 2050 this uncertainty range is less than 1.5 billion people, and 
by 2100 it doubles to about 3 billion people.
The figure also shows that in more than 60 percent o f all cases the growth o f the total world 
population levels off during the second half o f the next century, or even starts to decline. 
Given that the world population in mid-1996 was estimated at 5.8 billion, Lutz et al. (1996, 
1997) find that the probability o f a doubling -  that is, reaching or surpassing the 11.6 billion 
mark at any point during the next century -  is only 33 percent. In other words, there is a two- 
thirds probability that world population will not double during the 21 st century.
1 Sensitivity analyses assuming that the high and low values covered 85% and 95% instead of 90% of all 
cases showed that the results are relatively insensitive to this parameter. Thus the high-low range may be 
thought to cover 85-95% of all cases.
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Figure 1. Merged distribution o f the size o f the world’s population (in billions): 1995-2100
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Source: Lutz et al. 1996.
Regional results for the case o f uncorrelated fertility and mortality trends are summarized in 
Table 1. (page 34). Sub-Saharan Africa displays the largest range o f uncertainty in future 
population size, with a 95 percent confidence interval in 2100 ranging from 578 million to 
4.345 billion around a mean o f 1.9 billion. This large range results from the unusually large 
uncertainty surrounding trends in fertility and mortality in the region, in addition to the as­
sumption that the two trends will be uncorrelated. On the other hand, it can be shown that if 
fertility and mortality are assumed to be positively correlated within the region, the range o f 
uncertainty becomes significantly smaller.
The distribution o f the percentage o f the global population above age 60 is shown in Figure 2. 
All the lines are rising, indicating confidence that the percentage o f older people in the popu­
lation will rise over time. In 2050, the mean percentage is 20 compared with 9.5 in 1995, 
with a 95 percent uncertainty interval between 15 percent and 26 percent. By 2100, the mean 
increases to 27 percent, with a 95 percent uncertainty interval between 19 percent and 41 
percent. In other words, there is a 95 percent chance that the proportion o f elderly will at 
least double over the next century. In the most likely case it will almost triple, and it may even 
more than quadruple. The uncertainty in the percentage above age 60 grows significantly 
during the second half o f the 21st century due mainly to the uncertainty in future old-age 
mortality when combined with uncertainty in fertility.
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Table 1. Population (in millions) by region for probabilistic projections assuming uncorrelated 
fertility and mortality. Mean, median, and 95 percent confidence intervals for 2020, 2050, 
and 2100. Source: Lutz 1996.
R egion 1995
2020 2050
M e a n 1’ M e d .c 2 .5 % d 9 7 .5 % d M e a n b M e d .c 2 .5 % d 9 7 .5 % d
N o rth  A fric a 162 277 277 254 300 440 439 309 583
Sub-Saharan  A frica 558 1059 1058 965 1159 1625 1605 1085 2316
C h in a  &  C P A 1362 1670 1670 1526 1826 1888 1865 1351 2574
P acific  A sia 447 629 629 576 678 802 7 % 579 1047
P acific  O E C D 147 155 155 145 167 146 146 117 182
C e ntra l A sia 54 87 87 76 100 139 137 88 206
M id d le  East 151 300 300 279 324 520 515 380 692
S outh A sia 1240 1845 1845 1737 1949 2380 2368 1833 2970
Eastern Euro pe 122 124 124 116 133 111 n o 86 141
European FS U * 238 224 224 209 240 189 188 144 241
W estern  Euro pe 447 479 479 446 512 472 471 370 584
L a tin  A m e rica 4 77 697 696 646 746 930 925 707 1177
N o rth  A m e ric a 297 356 356 3 20 400 405 403 303 534
R egion
2100
M e a n b M e d .c 2 .5 % d 9 7 .5 % d
N o rth  A frica 630 598 228 1202
Sub-Saharan  A fric a 1909 1738 578 4345
C h in a  &  C P A 2051 1873 709 4428
P acific  A sia 876 829 322 1696
Pacific O E C D 125 120 59 221
C entra l A sia 212 194 65 4 77
M id d le  East 786 738 320 1516
S outh Asia 2365 2246 1014 4327
Eastern E uro pe 83 78 31 168
E uropean F S U * 147 138 53 290
W estern Euro pe 430 416 196 769
L a tin  A m e ric a 1163 1106 489 2142
N o rth  A m e rica 482 467 229 865
‘ E uro pean part o f  the form er Soviet U n io n . 
bD ata  on the m ean population size. 
cD ata on the m edian population size.
‘ C o lu m n s  labeled 2 .5 %  and 9 7 .5 %  provid e  data on the lo w e r and upper bounds, respectively, o f  the 95 percent confidence interval: 
2 .5 %  o f all observations lie below  the lo w e r bound and 9 7 .5 %  o f  all observations lie be low  the upper bound. A l l  figures are based 
on 1,000 sim ulations and w ere produced using D I A L O G ,  the m ultistate population projection m odel. F e rtility  and m o rta lity  are 
assum ed to be uncorrelated w ith in  regions.
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Figure 2. Merged distribution o f the population o f the world in the 60+ age group (in per­
cent).
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Source: Lutz et al. 1996.
Summarizing all the different global and regional results o f the IIASA probabilistic popula­
tion projection and alternative scenario analyses, it can be said that there are three near cer­
tainties:
(i) World population will increase substantially from its current level. Even in the lowest 
growth extreme scenario, population increases by close to 2 billion before commencing its 
decline. However a further doubling o f world population has become unlikely.
(ii) The distribution o f world population will continue to shift towards Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). Even assuming rapid fertility decline and little improvement in mortality, 
LDCs still account for a rising share o f world population.
(iii) The world population will continue to age. Probabilistic projections show that a dou­
bling o f the proportion above age 60 is a near certainty.
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The need to reassess the role of the population variable 
in sustainable human development
Do these probabilistic population outlooks capture the possibilities o f ’’Malthusian checks” 
or o f the feedbacks from environmental variables on mortality and migration? In principle, 
yes, because the group o f experts who defined the 90 percent probability ranges for future 
fertility, mortality and migration trends was explicitly asked to include the possibilities o f 
such feedbacks and other possible limiting factors, such as food supply or clean water, in 
their assessments. Hence theoretically, these probabilistic projections should also cover 
extreme events, such as devastating natural disasters or wars, but considering them to be low 
probability events far out in the tails o f the assumed probability distribution o f future life 
expectancies or migration intensities. Some other disasters with much higher probability, 
such as AIDS mortality in Southern Africa, are reflected in the assumption that with a 50 
percent probability, Sub-Saharan Africa will see significant further reductions in life expectancy.
Especially in face o f these quantitative assumptions about possible and likely future popula­
tion trends, it becomes obvious how little we actually know about the processes that deter­
mine future fertility, mortality and migration. And we are equally groping in the dark about 
the likely consequences o f alternative population trends on social, economic, institutional 
and environmental aspects. But policy makers need information about the likely effects o f 
alternative population paths. They need a scientific basis for their policies in order to make a 
decision between the alternative policy options. Such scientific analysis needs to be informed 
by plausible theory and by empirical data. Most importantly it needs to be oriented towards 
the future. Since policies are made to influence the future course o f things and not the past 
(that cannot be changed), the scientific basis for such policies also needs to refer to the 
future. In this context it does not help much to know what has happened during the 1970s or 
1980s when policies are to be made for the first decade o f the new millennium, unless we 
assume that conditions over the next decade will be identical to those during the period stud­
ied. In some cases this assumption may be justified; in others it is clearly wrong. But who can 
make such judgements? It is only the experts, including demographers, that study these phe­
nomena in much detail who should be in the position to tell the planners whether the trends 
and causal mechanisms they identified for the past are likely to hold for the future, or in what 
way they are expected to be different. Unfortunately most o f the demographers seem to shy 
away from this task. It is conspicuous to see what small proportion o f the demographic lit­
erature is being devoted to explicit statements about future trends, although this seems to be 
what the public expects most from demographers.
In the context o f the international process o f  World Population Conferences, and particu­
larly in the process o f  reviewing the progress made since the Cairo ‘94 conference, the 
international demographic community as represented by the IUSSP (International Union for 
the Scientific Study o f Population) has stressed the need for a major new assessment o f the 
role o f the population variable in the context o f the massive demographic changes recently 
observed. These changes are not yet sufficiently well reflected in the agenda o f international 
agencies in the field. As discussed above, rapid population aging will not be limited to indus-
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tnalized countries. It is expected to cause even more significant problems in the developing 
countries because o f the absence o f established social security schemes. The devastating 
consequences o f AIDS in Southern Africa, persistent poverty and the interactions between 
population and the environment are other key issues that need more attention by both scien­
tists and the international policy community.
The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends (United Nations 1973) pub­
lished 25 years ago is still the only comprehensive scientific summary o f the role o f the 
population variable in development. But as described above, the world has changed a lot since 
then. Two hundred years after the Malthus essay, and 25 years after The Determinants and 
Consequences of Population Trends, it seems to be time for another comprehensive as­
sessment o f the role o f the population variable in sustainable human development. This as­
sessment should reflect our understanding o f these complex interactions at the turn o f the 
millennium rather than those o f the late 18th century or the 1970s. In substantive terms the 
key challenges to be covered are linkages between micro- and macro-levels (i.e. individual 
rights and decisions versus societal concerns), considering stratified rather than homoge­
neous populations, and studying the impacts o f changes in the sizes o f different age groups 
rather than simply total population size (including both the growth and the aging concerns).
I am confident that such a more differentiated approach, together with better availability of 
data and more sophisticated analytical tools, will contribute to moving even further beyond 
the often simplistic controversy that still surrounds Malthus. If we can gain a better under­
standing o f these complex processes, it will be worth the effort, and will provide a useful 
basis for the formulation o f future population related policies.
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